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"FAIRER STILL THE WOODLANDS" 
MAPPING THE FREE EXERCISE FOREST 
RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE 
EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS. By Kent Greenawalt. 1 
Princeton University Press. 2006. Pp. xi+ 455. $39.00. 
John Witte, Jr. 2 
A familiar hymn, still sung with gusto on many Sunday 
mornings, has a couple of choice lines that came to mind as I 
read Kent Greenawalt's latest masterwork: "Fair are the mead-
ows, fairer still the woodlands.'' 3 Most souls brave enough to en-
ter the First Amendment forest of religious liberty are more 
likely to come out shouting "foul" than singing "fair." "Foul" in 
the baseball sense because some of the Supreme Court's recent 
cases applying the First Amendment establishment and free ex-
ercise clauses keep rolling wide of the right(s) baseline. "Foul" 
in the olfactory sense because this First Amendment forest now 
has the distinct aroma of founding principles of religious liberty 
rotting from neglect and of novel doctrines of neutrality that just 
don't smell right. And "foul" in the equitable sense because the 
First Amendment religion clauses have been so weakened by re-
cent Supreme Court cases that the protection of American reli-
gious liberty is falling increasingly to other legal provisions and 
other branches of government. It is no small irony that today 
Congress and state courts provide more religious liberty than the 
federal courts, and that the First Amendment free speech clause 
provides more protection for religious claimants than the First 
Amendment free exercise clause. 
Kent Greenawalt's projected two volume series on Religion 
and the Constitution provides the reader with a clear map 
1. University Professor, Columbia University School of Law. 
2. Jonas Robitscher Professor of Law and Director of the Center for the Study of 
Law and Religion. Emory University. 
3. A line in the Silesian folk song, "Fairest Lord Jesus" viewed at hup:!lmy. 
homewithgod.comlheavenlymidis2/fairest.html (August 15, 2007). 
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through this dank First Amendment forest, and a cogent guide 
to a fairer religious liberty jurisprudence. The first volume, subti-
tled ''Free Exercise and Fairness,'' is the book here under re-
view. The second volume, on the establishment clause, is in the 
works. This first volume is a free standing tome that can be read 
without its companion. But it properly puts off some of the con-
stitutional questions (involving issues like Sabbath law and reli-
gious tax exemptions) that implicate both free exercise and es-
tablishment clause questions. If the elegance and acuity of this 
first volume are any indication, you would be wise to place an 
advanced order for the second. These volumes are destined to 
become standard research guides and teaching tools for religious 
liberty scholars. students, and advocates alike. 
The main purpose of this volume is to explore the many ar-
eas of free exercise law that have occupied federal (and some-
times state) courts, legislatures, and agencies-and to suggest re-
forms that will bring greater freedom, fairness, and firmness to 
each of these areas of law. After a brief conceptual framing and 
analysis of the history of the First Amendment religion clauses, 
Greenawalt offers a score of chapters that take up various reli-
gious liberty issues, which are distilled a bit in a brief concluding 
chapter. The issues include the claims of individuals to conscien-
tious objections to military service, education, oath swearing, 
medical procedures, and more; their claims to special constitu-
tional protections for religious drug use, dress, ornamentation, 
grooming, proselytism, Sabbath observance, sacred sites, child 
custody, tithe payments, and others; and their calls for special re-
ligious rights and liberties within the military, prisons, hospitals, 
public schools, government agencies, public forums, and private 
workplaces and associations. Greenawalt also takes up the 
claims of churches and other religious organizations to special 
rules to associate and incorporate, to discriminate or propagate 
their views on religious grounds, to protect their confidential 
clerical communications, to resolve their own internal disputes 
over property, to gain special protections in bankruptcy proceed-
ings, and to receive tax exemptions, zoning privileges, and his-
toric preservation immunities-and the limits on these and other 
claims when religious associations, through their officials or 
agents, engage in crimes, torts, or untoward conduct. This topical 
organization of the chapters (and the detailed index) makes the 
book valuable both as a reference for those interested in selected 
topics of religious liberty, and as an overview of the field that 
can be read cover to cover. 
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Most of the chapters pose the legal problematic(s) at issue, 
rehearse the relevant cases, statutes, and regulations on point, 
and then offer a critical reading-sometimes concurring in, 
sometimes dissenting from, often nuancing and urging improve-
ments to the prevailing law and legal opinion on point. The book 
ranges well beyond traditional First Amendment free exercise 
issues heard by the Supreme Court. Greenawalt analyzes the full 
range of freedoms of private parties to exercise their religious 
beliefs, and the appropriate limits that may be imposed on this 
exercise for the sake of health, safety, and welfare of the com-
munity or the fundamental rights of others. On a number of the 
issues that have reached the Supreme Court, Greenawalt com-
pares its opinions with those of lower federal and state courts, 
enhancing the legal complexity of the issues and the range of 
possibilities for their fairer resolution. The reader also gets a 
vivid sense of many federal and state statutes and regulations 
governing religion (dealing with laws of bankruptcy, health care, 
workplace, construction, and the like) that, for better or worse, 
have proceeded without much constitutional scrutiny so far. 
Intermittently, Greenawalt pauses to introduce readers to 
the key steps of pressing a prima facie free exercise case under 
the First Amendment. Parties must not only meet the general 
standing, case and controversy, ripeness, and political question 
thresholds. They must also demonstrate their sincerity and good 
faith, and the presence of a substantial burden that has been im-
posed on the exercise of their religion. Greenawalt traces the 
shifting standards of review in different eras and areas of reli-
gious liberty law, and the ample problematics that confront 
courts in balancing free exercise claims against government 
power and balancing one party's religious rights assertions 
against the private rights claims of others. He also explores 
deeply the perennially contentious issues of legislatively and ju-
dicially created exemptions for religious claimants who meet 
these prima facie requirements, coming out in favor of most of 
them (pp. 27-34, 109-56, 201-32). 
The book is written with elegance, power, and lucidity-and 
filled with the kind of wit, wisdom, and Wissenschaft that 
Greenawalt's readers have come to expect from his dozen earlier 
tomes on the constitutional and philosophical foundations of 
law, religion, and morality.4 Readers cannot help but see a keen 
4. See. among his other volumes on this topic: KENT GREENAWALT. DOES Goo 
BELONG IN SCHOOLS (2005): KENT GREENAWALT. PRIVATE CO!'<SCIENCES Al'<D 
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intellectual and incisive teacher at work in these pages, who 
knows just how to probe and push the law at propitious points, 
and how to map out complicated arguments so all can under-
stand what is at stake. He makes judicious use of the vast re-
sources at hand. He picks selectively among the hundreds of 
scholarly texts, addresses the main federal cases and statutes, 
and introduces some interesting state cases and statutes (such as 
those on snake handling, church tort liability, and child care and 
custody disputes based on religion) that have not been enough 
part of the mainstream of scholarship on religious liberty. And 
while characteristically generous and genial in his treatment of 
others, he does not flinch from dishing out firm rebukes and 
withering criticisms of courts and commentators who have 
strayed from the right path. 
The right path of religious liberty, as Greenawalt sees it, is 
that government must accommodate if not facilitate "the maxi-
mum expression of religious conviction that is consistent with a 
commitment to fairness and the public welfare" Uacket). "I be-
lieve strongly in the major values that lie behind free exercise 
and nonestablishment," he elaborates in a strong early passage 
that sets the tone of the book. 
People should be free to adopt religious beliefs and engage in 
religious practices because that is one vital aspect of personal 
autonomy, and because recognition of that freedom is more 
conducive to social harmony in a modem society than any 
other alternative. I believe, further, that most people experi-
ence some transcendent dimension in their lives and that, de-
spite the unavailability of decisive evidence, that experience 
reflects some objective reality. Whether the government 
should involve itself in promoting religious values may be ar-
guable, but my own view is that personal autonomy is most 
fully recognized and the flourishing of religion itself is best 
served if the government does not sponsor religious under-
standings and practices (pp. 3--4). 
With such a robust view of religious liberty, Greenawalt is 
predictably critical of those who dismiss religion as too "silly" to 
worry about or too sinister to protect except perhaps as a pecu-
liar private preoccupation. "A serious person trying to grapple with 
the state's treatment of religion has to undertake a much more 
arduous effort to distill the nature of our county's traditions and 
PUBLIC REASONS (1995); KENT GREENAWALT. RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND 
POLITICAL CHOICE (1988); KENT GREENAWALT. CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY 
(1987). 
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of sound practice in modern political democracies" (p. 4; see also 
pp. 124-56). Greenawalt is equally critical of those who would 
wish to reduce the First Amendment religion clauses to simple 
formulas such as "separation of church and state," "equal treat-
ment," or "government neutrality" toward religion. Questions of 
religious liberty are too complex to be judged by simple apho-
risms or mechanical tests, he insists. They require a judicious 
balancing of "multiple values," "principles," and "doctrines" at 
once (pp. 5-9, 14-15)-not least the collection of religious lib-
erty principles forged by the eighteenth-century founders: liberty 
of conscience, freedom of exercise, religious equality, religious 
pluralism, separation of church and state, and disestablishment 
of religion (pp. 20-22). And Greenawalt is critical of those who 
regard the free exercise clause as redundant of First Amendment 
guarantees of free speech, press, and association and Fourteenth 
Amendment guarantees of due process and equal protection 
(pp. 228-32, 387-95, 439-41). The Constitution declares that re-
ligion is a special category of liberty, he insists, and it deserves "a 
core of undisputed protection" not available elsewhere in the 
Constitution. "Neither the federal government nor states can in-
terfere with religious belief or religious expression or with reli-
gious practice that causes no harm apart from its religious sig-
nificance; no government can single out a religion for adverse 
targeting ... ; no government can discriminate against one or 
some religions in relation to other religions" (p. 440; see also pp. 
15-25). 
Constitutional scholars will not be surprised that 
Greenawalt's criticisms of these reductionist approaches to relig-
ion and religious liberty lead him to rebuke the Supreme Court's 
current reductionist free exercise law. In the 1990 case of Em-
ployment Division v. Smith,' the Court reduced the free exercise 
guarantee to a type of heightened rational basis review. The 
Smith Court held that laws that are judged to be "neutral and 
generally applicable" will pass muster under the free exercise 
clause, regardless of the burden cast on religion or the nature of 
the power exercised by government. Even a law that crushes a 
central belief or practice of a free exercise claimant will survive 
constitutional challenge if it is neutrally drafted and generally 
applicable to all. Only if the law is not neutrally drafted or gen-
erally applicable will government be required to demonstrate a 
compelling government interest that overrides the burdened free 
5. Employment Div .. Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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exercise right.6 While he properly works hard to show that the 
Smith test has not been entirely toothless, especially in the hands 
of some able federal judges, Greenawalt is sharply critical of this 
formulation of the free exercise guarantee. He views the Smith 
test as "arbitrary," "puzzling," "anomalous," "based little on 
original understanding" of the free exercise clause and more on 
"jerry-rigged" arguments, "if not ex nihilo'' reasoning. For all its 
facile distinctions of earlier precedents and its fictional talk of 
"hybrid rights" exceptions, the Smith case is "a striking aban-
donment" of well-settled precedent and a "distressing" "Pro-
crustean one-size-fits-all to the bewildering richness of religious 
practice and convictions" (pp. 31-33, 75-83). It introduces a 
"harsh, religion-blind" neutrality, and exposes a Court that "has 
simply given up on protecting a wide range of free exercise rights 
for religious minorities" and left them to seek whatever protec-
tions they can from legislators and state judges (pp. 79, 227). 
Greenawalt calls for Smith to be reversed, the free exercise 
clause to be restored, and the federal courts to be returned to se-
rious protection of religious liberty for all- even those with ex-
otic and unpopular beliefs and practices that now find rather lit-
tle sympathy from legislators and state judges who tend to keep 
their eyes on majoritarian sentiment and the next election. 
Constitutional scholars will be at least a bit surprised, how-
ever, that Greenawalt does not embrace wholeheartedly the 
"strict scrutiny" standard of free exercise review that Smith had 
jettisoned. This standard requires government to prove a com-
pelling state interest and the least restrictive alternative to 
achieving that interest when a law or state action is challenged 
under the free exercise clause. It also outlaws blatant religious 
discrimination by government whether on the face of a statute or 
in its application. This strict scrutiny standard had been earlier 
introduced by the Supreme Court in Sherbert v. Verner (1963),7 
the "high water mark of free exercise" law (pp. 29, 177-83). It 
became (in)famous among constitutional scholars after Wiscon-
sin v. Yoder (1972), the case that exempted Amish children from 
full compliance with mandatory school attendance laws.8 Strict 
scrutiny had been the Court's standard of choice in ten free ex-
6. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye. Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 
(1993) (local ordinance transparently discriminating against ritual sacrifice of animals 
violates the free exercise clause). 
7. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (free exercise clause forbids state to 
deny unemployment compensation to claimant discharged from a job that would require 
her to work on her Sabbath). 
8. Wisconsin v. Yoder. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
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ercise cases from 1963 to 1989.9 After Smith announced the neu-
trality standard in 1990, Congress reintroduced the strict scrutiny 
standard in the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA), adducing Sherbert and Yoder as its prototypes. 10 In 
1997, the Court struck down RFRA as applied to the states, but 
left it standing as applied to Congress.11 Congress also introduced 
this strict scrutiny standard in the Religious Land Use and Insti-
tutional Persons Act (RLUIPAt and in several other discrete 
federal statutes which apply to both federal and state govern-
ments. In 2005, a 9-0 Supreme Court upheld RLUIPA,13 and 
lower federal courts have since upheld other federal statutes 
with strict scrutiny standards. A number of states have adopted 
this strict scrutiny standard test, too, in their state constitutional 
and statutory laws on religious liberty- not least in the thirteen 
state religious freedom restoration acts that have been issued in 
the past decade. And, international laws on religious liberty, like 
the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to 
which the United States is a signatory, have a form of strict scru-
tiny review, under the human rights standards of "necessity and 
proportionality." 14 So, with all this support for strict scrutiny to 
protect free exercise rights, what gives Greenawalt pause? 
Fairness is the short answer. While he agrees with the re-
sults of most federal and state cases that have used a strict scru-
tiny standard, Greenawalt finds that an uncritical application of 
this standard may well hurt the cause of religious liberty more 
than help it. Slavish application of this standard carries the risk 
of "arbitrary decision and unjustified favoritism" for popular re-
ligions, and it often burdens courts with "undeniably difficult" 
and "time consuming" tasks that can bring too little reward (p. 
201). A strict scrutiny regime inevitably attracts many spurious if 
not fraudulent claims by those with time on their hands, notably, 
prisoners who file the majority of cases. It sometimes forces 
judges to review closely not only the sincerity and good faith of 
the free exercise claimant, but also the centrality of the belief or 
9. The most recent was Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec .. 489 U.S. 829 
(1989) (state may not deny unemployment benefits to claimant who refused to take a job 
that might require him to work on Sunday). 
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1 to 2000bb-4 (1993). 
11. City of Boerne v. Flores. 521 U.S. 507 ( 1997). 
12. 42 U.S.C. 2000cc (1993). 
13. Cutter v. Wilkinson. 125 S. Ct. 2113 (2005). 
14. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI). U.N. Doc. A/RES/21/2200 (Dec. 16. 1966). See com-
parative analysis in a recent Symposium. The Foundations and Frontiers of Religious 
Liberty: A 25th Anniversary Celebration of the 1981 UN Declaration on the Religious Tol-
erance. 21 EMORY lNT'L L. REV. 1-266 (2007). 
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practice being burdened and the substantiality of the burden it-
self-inquiries which themselves can be deeply intrusive and in-
jurious (pp. 109-56, 201-32). And, it must be remembered that 
in free exercise law, strict scrutiny is not "strict in theory, but fa-
tal in fact," as it has been in equal protection and free speech law 
(p. 215, quoting Gerald Gunther). Even in the Sherbert and 
Yoder heyday of 1963-1989, when the Supreme Court had strict 
scrutiny as its stated free exercise standard, government won 
nearly half the cases-and in four other free exercise cases in 
that era, the Court simply used a different test and found for the 
government each time." Similarly, in the early years of RFRA, 
government won more than 80% of the time against RFRA 
claimants. Still today, most RFRA and RLUIPA claimants lose, 
a number of them now stumbling at the preliminary inquiry of 
whether they even have a "substantial burden" on their free ex-
ercise rights. The strict scrutiny regime of free exercise-
whether constitutional or statutory- has not been so unequivo-
cally favorable to religious liberty as an uncritical reading might 
suggest, Greenawalt concludes. 
In what he calls the "most important chapter in the book" 
(p. 8), Greenawalt thus presses for a more nuanced balancing 
test between free exercise rights and government power-
yielding what is effectively an "intermediate standard" of height-
ened scrutiny for free exercise cases (pp. 201-32). (This is a 
standard that he would also apply as far as possible in resolving 
clashes between religious claimants and other private parties 
(pp. 326-76)). To deter unnecessary constitutional litigation, 
Greenawalt calls for religious liberty litigants to weigh more 
carefully the centrality of the belief and practice that is being 
burdened, and to desist from making a federal case out of man-
ageable or avoidable burdens on discretionary religious conduct. 
He calls for government officials, in turn, to weigh more care-
fully the seriousness of the state power and program that is being 
implemented, and to desist from intruding on religious beliefs 
and practices that could easily be spared by taking a discretion-
15. See Goldman v. Weinberger. 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (military officer does not have 
free exercise right to wear his yarmulke on duty contrary to military dress code); Bowen 
v. Roy. 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (agency's use of social security number does not violate free 
exercise rights of Native American. who believes such use would impair his child's spirit): 
O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz. 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (denying free exercise accommodation 
for Muslim prisoner to engage in collective Friday worship): Lyng v. Nw. Indian Ceme-
tery Protective Ass·n. 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (construction of road through section of na-
tional forest regarded as sacred ground by three tribes does not violate free exercise 
clause). 
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ary step or two. Such mutual restraint and self-help by both 
sides, he argues, will keep the court dockets free from so many 
silly cases that have given the strict scrutiny standard such a bad 
name and such a modest record of success. (If only constitutional 
law had Rule 11-like sanctions and "frivolous litigation" penal-
ties on both sides to make this aspiration for self-restraint stick.) 
To streamline the federal litigation that should go forward even 
after such self-restraint, Greenawalt calls on federal judges to 
exercise greater deference in honoring sincere, good faith claims 
that an "important" religious interest has been unduly burdened, 
and to press legislatures to work harder to find less restrictive al-
ternatives that minimize these burdens. And he calls for courts 
to make judicious use of free exercise exemptions and immuni-
ties to remove the heaviest burdens on important religious inter-
ests that remain substantially burdened, despite everyone's best 
efforts. "Although engaging in such an exercise is indeed trou-
blesome for courts," he admits, "this is one of those domains of 
law in which messiness at the edges, and uneven application" of 
the law to accommodate the unusual are necessary to achieve 
maximum fairness for all (p. 214). 
Even if the balancing test can be fixed in this way, 
Greenawalt seems reluctant to make the First Amendment free 
exercise clause the only or even the principal forum for protect-
ing the freedom of religious exercise (pp. 228-32, 387-93, 439-
43). One of the ironies of the Smith case is that it has aided the 
cause of religious liberty by pressing litigants and legislators to 
look elsewhere in the Constitution for fuller and firmer protec-
tion-and with some notable successes. For example, despite 
Smith, religious liberty litigants have continued to find ample 
protection against religious discrimination under the First 
Amendment free speech clause. 16 And they have used the free 
speech, establishment, and equal protection clauses together to 
create a whole series of precedents that grant religious parties 
equal access to government facilities, forums, and even funds 
made available to like-positioned non-religious parties. 17 All 
16. See most recently. Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc'y of N.Y.. Inc. v. Village of 
Stratton. 536 U.S. 150 (2002) (village ordinance requiring door-to-door solicitors and 
canvassers to obtain a permit containing one's name violates constitutional free speech 
and free exercise rights because of its breadth and unprecedented nature. and is not nar-
rowly enough tailored to the stated interest of preventing fraud. crime. and privacy intru-
siOn). 
17. See the series of cases from Widmar v. Vincent. 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (when a 
state university creates a limited public forum open to voluntary student groups. religious 
groups must be given "equal access" to that forum) to Good News Club v. Milford Cen-
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these are religious liberty byproducts of the new clause shopping 
catalyzed by Smith (pp. 228-38, 243-45, 440-43). These kinds of 
protections had not been much part of the strict scrutiny free ex-
ercise law before Smith. 1H It's a legitimate question, which 
Greenwalt leaves dangling, what a more rigorous and judiciously 
applied free exercise standard might do to these important lines 
of cases-subsume them, eclipse them, or reject them? 
Greenawalt also leaves dangling the question-no doubt to 
be tied down firmly in the next volume on the establishment 
clause-whether statutory protections of religious liberty are ul-
timately adequate or even constitutional. In nearly two hundred 
separate pieces of federal legislation issued since the 1990 Smith 
case, Congress has built in new special exemptions, privileges, 
immunities, benefits, and treatments for religious parties. 19 These 
include not only the loudly orchestrated enactments of RFRA 
and RLUIPA or the recent tweaks to the familiar 501(c)(3) in-
come tax exemptions for religious groups. They include the quite 
visible- and for some quite risible- International Religious 
Freedom Act (1998) and the various new laws on faith-based ini-
tiatives. But beyond these, largely unnoticed by the public and 
largely unchecked by the courts is a sprawling network of special 
religious rights that have been quietly stitched into federal laws 
governing all manner of subjects -laws of evidence and civil 
procedure, disability, labor, employment, unions, civil rights, in-
terstate commerce, bankruptcy, ERISA, workplace, military, 
immigration and naturalization, food and drugs, prisons, hospi-
tals, land use, and much more. And federal laws are only part of 
this network. State, county, city, and village laws creating special 
religious rights for some of these same topics, as well as for local 
issues like property tax, zoning, non-profit organizations, educa-
tion, charity, and the like can number in the thousands-
particularly in Bible Belt states. 
tral Sch .. 533 U.S. 98 (2002) (a public middle school's exclusion of Christian children's 
club from meeting on school property after hours was unconstitutional viewpoint dis-
crimination. and was not required to avoid establishment of religion). But cf Locke v. 
Davey. 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (upholding a state scholarship program established to assist 
payment of academically-gifted students' post-secondary education expenses for all stu-
dents. except those pursuing a theology degree). 
18. The only cases are Widmar. 454 U.S. at 7. and indirectly McDaniel v. Paty, 435 
U.S. 618 (1978) (state constitutional prohibition against clergy holding political office 
violates First Amendment rights). 
19. See the recent series of articles by Diana B. Henriques, N.Y. TIMES. October 8-
11. 2006. 
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The Supreme Court has long viewed narrow and well tar-
geted special religious rights provisions in legislation as suitable 
accommodations of religion- that are neither mandated by the 
free exercise clause nor prohibited by the establishment clause.20 
In recent years, the Court has further made clear that many of 
these religious accommodation issues are for the legislatures, not 
for the courts, to decide, and for the states and not for the fed-
eral government to put in place. This small explosion of relig-
iously favorable legislation in the past two decades is part and 
product of broader constitutional moves toward stronger separa-
tion of powers at the federal level, and stronger empowerment 
of the states. 
It will be intriguing to see how this new statutory matrix of 
religious liberty will fare in Greenawalt's sequel volume on the 
establishment of religion. The indications we get from this first 
volume are that statutory accommodations of "important" reli-
gious interests-such as an individual's conscientious objections 
to military service or a church's right to resolve its own disputes 
or to discriminate on religious grounds in core religious em-
ployment decisions-are not only "fair" but "essential" for the 
protection of religious liberty (pp. 49-67, 261-89, 377-95). But 
tax exemptions, zoning privileges, bankruptcy priorities, eviden-
tiary immunities and the like that touch on less essential reli-
gious interests may not be so important to religious liberty, at 
least at the constitutional level. They might well have to yield to 
other constitutional considerations, not least the constitutional 
prohibition on religious establishment. 
If all these separate pieces of protection- federal and state, 
constitutional and statutory, procedural and remedial- are 
viewed together, one cannot resist Greenawalt's overall conclu-
sion that religious liberty is "fairer" today than is generally ad-
mitted by many constitutional scholars who have been preoccu-
pied with Smith. The issue that remains is whether all this legal 
complexity is necessary if the First Amendment free exercise 
clause is strong, and whether it is not fairer to press for a strong 
20. The earliest such holdings were Gibbons v. District of Columbia. 116 U.S. 404 
(1886) (allowing property tax scheme that exempted "church buildings, and grounds ac-
tually occupied by such buildings"); Arver v. United States. 245 U.S. 366 (1918) (uphold-
ing Congress's power to define conscientious objector status and Congress's restriction of 
the status to ordained ministers. theology students. and members of well-recognized paci-
fist sects). Among recent cases. see especially Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of N.Y .. 397 
U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding state property tax exemption for church property against dis-
establishment clause challenge). 
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federal free exercise clause rather than settle for a fair map 
through a diffuse legal regime. 
My own view is that free speech, equal protection, and 
statutory protections of religious liberty cannot ultimately substi-
tute for a more rigorous First Amendment free exercise clause.c1 
To be sure, the development of these doctrines post-Smith testi-
fies both to the ingenuity of litigants and legislators and to the 
flexibility of the constitutional process to accommodate the 
pressing spiritual needs of citizens. And to be sure, the develop-
ment of these doctrines has provided some religious minorities 
with forms and forums of relief hitherto foreclosed to them. 
These can only be temporary refuges for religious liberty, 
however. Speech is only one form of religious exercise; equality 
is only one principle that the free exercise clause protects. Even 
generously defined, "speech" cannot embrace many forms of in-
dividual and corporate religious exercise- from the silent medi-
tations of the sages to the noisy pilgrimages of the saints, from 
the corporate consecration of the sanctuary to the ecclesiastical 
discipline of the clergy. Even expansively interpreted, "equality" 
cannot protect the special needs of religious individuals and reli-
gious groups. These needs were traditionally protected by the 
principles of liberty of conscience and separation of church and 
state and traditionally reflected in the exemptions and exclusions 
countenanced and created by the free exercise clause. 
Moreover, statutory provisions cannot permanently substi-
tute for constitutional principles of free exercise. A statutory 
scheme makes the protection of freedom of exercise considera-
bly more fractured and chaotic than necessary-and notably un-
even for groups whose religious claims are viewed with suspi-
cion: Just ask Scientologists or Unification Church members 
today. It also makes the protection of religious liberty too politi-
cal. It is an elementary, but essential, political reality that stat-
utes generally privilege the views of the majority, not the minor-
ity. They are passed by elected officials who must be as vigilant 
in reflecting popular opinion as protecting constitutional impera-
tives. Too many of the recent federal statutes on religious liberty 
are products of special lobbying by powerful majoritarian reli-
gious groups who tend to serve their own interests through these 
exemptions, immunities, privileges, and earmarks. The free ex-
ercise clause, by contrast, is designed to protect the needs of the 
21. These next paragraphs are distilled from my book RELIGION AND THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT (2005). which provides detailed sources. 
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minority as much as the majority. Its provisions are enforced by 
appointed officials who must be more vigilant about protecting 
constitutional imperatives than reflecting popular opinion. The 
free exercise clause is designed to provide remedies for individu-
als and groups with insufficient political strength to have their 
religious views or practices reflected in or protected by statutes. 
Likewise, state laws on religious liberty can supplement, but 
not substitute for federal laws. The growing shift in emphasis 
from federal to state law leaves what should be common national 
rights of religious liberty too vulnerable to fleeting political fash-
ions and too contingent on a claimant's geographical location. In 
my view, the federal courts should provide universal and firm re-
ligious liberty protections for all American parties, no matter 
where they happen to reside or where they choose to file their 
claim. This need for a universal law on religious liberty, in the 
face of grim local bigotry at home and abroad, was among the 
compelling reasons that led the Supreme Court in the 1940s to 
"incorporate" the First Amendment religion clauses into the 
Fourteenth Amendment due process clause and make them 
binding on state and local governments. All those concerns over 
local religious bigotry and prejudice remain painfully pertinent 
today. 
The original vision of the founders was that religion was 
special and that it was deserving of special protection. The foun-
ders thus placed the free exercise clause alongside the free 
speech, press, and assembly clauses to provide religious claim-
ants with a special pathway to relief. Moreover, they put the free 
exercise clause in creative tension with the establishment clause 
to ensure that religious liberty received reciprocal protection. 
The First Amendment free exercise clause outlaws government 
proscriptions of religion-actions that unduly burden the con-
science, restrict forms of religious exercise and expression, dis-
criminate against religion, or invade the autonomy of churches 
and other religious bodies. The First Amendment establishment 
clause, in turn, outlaws government prescriptions of religion-
actions that unduly coerce the conscience, mandate forms of re-
ligious exercise and expression, discriminate in favor of religion, 
or improperly ally the government with churches or other reli-
gious bodies. Both the free exercise and establishment clauses 
thereby provide complementary protections to the first princi-
ples of religious liberty that the eighteenth-century American 
founders championed -liberty of conscience, freedom of reli-
gious exercise and expression, equality of a plurality of faiths be-
564 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 24:551 
fore the law, separation of church and state, and no establish-
ment of religion by law. 
One need not necessarily endorse a jurisprudence of 
originalism to embrace this multi-principled reading of the First 
Amendment religion clauses. This was also the vision articulated 
by the Supreme Court in the twin cases of Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut (1940) and Everson v. Board of Education (1947)22 that 
opened the modern era of the religious liberty. In both cases, the 
Court worked hard to balance these basic founding principles of 
religious liberty, and thereby to render the free exercise and es-
tablishment clauses complementary guarantees of religious lib-
erty. In Cantwell, the Court effectively read each of these princi-
ples into the free exercise clause, as well as the free speech 
clause as applied to religion. This First Amendment, Justice 
Roberts wrote for the Cantwell Court, protects "[f]reedom of 
conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization 
or form of worship as the individual may choose." It "safeguards 
the free exercise of the chosen form of religion," the "freedom to 
act" on one's beliefs. It protects a "plurality of forms and expres-
sions" of faith, each of which deserves equal protection under 
the law. It ensures the "basic separation" of religious and politi-
cal authorities and entities. For in "the realm of religious faith, 
and in that of political belief," the Court wrote, "sharp differ-
ences arise." 
But the people of this nation have ordained in light of history, 
that, in spite of the probability of the excesses and abuses, 
these liberties are, in the long view, essential to enlightened 
opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens of the 
democracy. The essential characteristic of these liberties is, 
that under their shield many types of life, character, opinion 
and belief can develop unmolested and unobstructed. No-
where is this shield more necessary than in our own country 
23 for a people composed of many races and of many creeds. 
Similarly, the Court in Everson v. Board of Education 
(1947), despite using famously strong language on strict separa-
tion of church and state, struck a rather judicious balance among 
these founding principles of religious liberty. "The 'establish-
ment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least 
this." Justice Black wrote for the Everson court. No federal or 
22. Cantwell v. Connecticut. 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing 
Twp .. 330 U.S. 1 (1947) 
23. Cantwell. 310 U.S. at 303--04,310. 
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state government (1) "can set up a church"-a violation of the 
core disestablishment principle; (2) "can force or influence a 
person to go or to remain away from church against his will or 
force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion"- a vio-
lation of liberty of conscience; (3) can "punish [a person] for en-
tertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church 
attendance or non-attendance"- a violation of both liberty of 
conscience and religious equality; or (4) "can, openly or secretly, 
participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups, 
or vice versa" -a violation of the principle of separation of 
church and state. Justice Black also underscored the founders' 
principle of religious pluralism and equality, declaring that gov-
ernment may not exclude "individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mo-
hammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Nonbelievers, Presbyte-
rians, or the members of any faith, because of their faith, or lack 
of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation." 
Liberty of conscience, freedom of exercise, religious equality, re-
ligious pluralism, separation of church and state, and no estab-
lishment of religion were all considered part of First Amend-
ment religious liberty in the Court's initial formulation. 24 
In this first volume, Professor Greenawalt has done noble 
service in calling the courts back to these founding principles of 
religious liberty, demonstrating the continued utility of these 
principles in original, hybrid, and novel forms, and in showing 
concretely and copiously how a multi-principled religious liberty 
jurisprudence can be applied to ensure a fairer law for all. I, for 
one, can't wait for the next volume. 
24. Everson. 330 U.S. at 15-16. 
